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The Dilemma of Presidential Leadership
Abstract
Every decade, about five thousand persons serve as college or university presidents. Over a term of office
averaging less than seven years, the president is expected to serve simultaneously as the chief administrator of
a large and complex bureaucracy, as the convening colleague of a professional community, as a symbolic elder
in a campus culture of shared values and symbols, and (in some institutions) as a public official accountable to
a public board and responsive to the demands of other governmental agencies. Balancing the conflicting
expectations of these roles has always been difficult; changing demographic trends, fiscal constraints, the
complexity and diversity of tasks, university dynamics, and unrealistic public expectations make it virtually
impossible for most presidents to provide the leadership that is expected.
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If any man wishes to be humbled and mortified, let
him become president of Harvard College (plaintive
cry of Harvard president Edward Holyoke on his
deathbed in 1769).
-F.S. Horn
Every decade, about five thousand persons serve as collegeor univer-
sity presidents. Over a term of office averaging less than seven years,
the president is expected to serve simultaneously as the chief adminis-
trator of a large and complex bureaucracy, as the convening colleague
of a professional community, as a symbolic elder in a campus culture
of shared values and symbols, and (in some institutions) as a public
official accountable to a public board and responsive to the demands of
other governmental agencies. Balancing the conflicting expectations
of these roles has always been difficult; changing demographic trends.
fiscal constraints, the complexity and diversity of tasks, university dy-
namics, and unrealistic public expectations make it virtually impos-
sible for most presidents to provide the leadership that is expected.
The college presidency may not be the second oldest profession in
America, but the role has existed in this country from the time of the
founding of Harvard in 1636, a century and half before there was a
nation. From the colonial period until the Civil War, institutions were
for the most part small, simply structured, and controlled by their
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lay boards of trustees, leading to a weak presidency. The president's
role even in those days was a demanding one and included teaching,
preaching, fund raising, record keeping, and (most especially) student
discipline, but in a simpler world of certain knowledge and accepted
authority most presidents were able to perform effectively the tasks
expected of them.
The period between the Civil War and World War I was one of ex-
pansion and transformation in higher education. New and more com-
plex institutions were created as research and public service were
added to the traditional teaching mission. The late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were times of the "great men," presidents
who often wielded unchecked authority to create great institutions.
Trustee boards were increasingly composed of businessmen who em-
braced the developing concepts of scientific management. Viewing the
college as comparable to a business firm, faculty were considered to be
employees hired to do as they were told, and the president, in Thor-
stein Veblen's caustic term, was the "Captain of Erudition," respon-
sible for increasing enrollment, capital, and reputation, while control-
ling costs.'
The job was clearly becoming more difficult, and observers of that
day could note that "the duties imposed upon the modern univer-
sity president are so multifarious that it is becoming exceedingly dif-
ficult to find a man capable of filling the position in the larger institu-
tions.'" But although the role had become more complex, it was still
one possible to fulfill; presidents had the power, and if they wished
(and many did) they could administer following the precept attributed
to Benjamin Jowett, the head of Balliol College, Oxford: "Never re-
tract. Never explain. Get the thing done and let them howl!"
As institutions became more comprehensive and involved in schol-
arship, the faculty became more specialized, more professionalized,
and less tolerant of administrative controls. Increasingly until World
War II, and then with accelerating force during the 1950s and 1960s,
faculty claimed for themselves the right not only to make decisions
concerning the major educational activities of the institution but also
to participate fully in setting institutional policy and to have a voice in
its management. The growing power of the faculty, a change signifi-
cant enough to justify referring to it as the "academic revolution,"!
was one of the forces that led postwar presidents to claim that "the
fundamental difficulty with the office of university president arises
out of the current system of controlling modern universities .... He
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has vast responsibilities for all phases of the life and welfare of the
university, but he has no power,"?
Presidential discretion was increasingly limited not only by forces
within the academy but by those outside as well. In particular, fed-
eral and state agencies were exerting influence over matters that had
previously been considered internal institutional prerogatives. The
loss of effective presidential authority, related internally to changes
in organizational complexity and patterns of influence and externally
to increased environmental constraints, helped to transform the role
from a difficult job to an impossible one.
This claim must be accompanied by a caveat. There are more than
3,500 collegesand universities, most (but not all) headed by a chief ex-
ecutive officerwith the title of president (or, less frequently, chancel-
lor). The composite public image ofa small number of the more visible
institutions tends to obscure their great diversity in size, wealth, pro-
gram level, complexity, student selectivity, faculty preparation, and
public or private sponsorship-all factors that affect presidential au-
thority and therefore the extent to which presidents can be effective.
The historical generalizations that have already been made, and the
analyses that follow, must therefore be applied with caution. In dis-
cussing the presidential role, this chapter focuses primarily upon in-
stitutions with at least moderate enrollments, multiple missions, and
comprehensive programs. Such institutions enroll most of the stu-
dents in higher education, but they probably represent less than half
of the total number of the nation's colleges and universities.
The Presidential Role
There is no standard definition of the presidency nor description of
the expectations placed on the performance of its incumbents. Presi-
dents traditionally have no stated term of officebut serve "at the plea-
sure" ofa public or private board oflay trustees. Institutional statutes
or bylaws commonly identify the president as the chief executive and
administrative officer of the board as well as the chief academic officer
of the faculty, and they delegate to the president all powers necessary
to perform these functions. Statements of such sweeping authority
may appear to the uninitiated to offer almost unlimited control over
administrative and programmatic initiatives, but the reality of pres i-
dential influence is quite different. As one president has commented,
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"regardless of what may appear in the charter and bylaws, the au-
thority of the president, his real leadership, depends on the willing-
ness of the campus to accept him as a leader. If it will not, well there
are other ways for him to earn a living." 5
There are many ways of looking at the components of the presi-
dential role. One typical listing identifies and describes responsi-
bilities inside and outside the institution. Inside the institution, presi-
dents report they spend their time planning, budgeting, making
personnel decisions, addressing academic issues, and dealing with
students. Outside, they find themselves raising funds, building and
managing board relations, working with community groups and rep-
resenting the institution to external constituents, and meeting with
policy makers." They spend time not only constructing buildings and
recruiting and hiring the brightest faculty but also upholding and em-
bodying core academic values.
From a more analytical perspective, presidential tasks can be seen
as comprising administrative, political, and entrepreneurial compo-
nents.' As administrator, the president carries out the policies of the
trustees, supervises subordinates, allocates resources, establishes sys-
tems of accountability, and performs functions similar to those found
in any complex organization. As politician, the president must be re-
sponsive to the needs of various constituencies whose support is criti-
cal to the maintenance of his or her position. The interests of groups
and subgroups offaculty, students, alumni, elected officialsand others
whose actions may constrain presidential discretion must be consid-
ered and courted, and the president must often form coalitions and
propose compromises that will permit peace with progress. As entre-
preneur, the president is expected to develop and exploit markets that
offer necessary resources for the institution. Fund-raising is perhaps
the most visible component of this role, but communicating with legis-
lators in the statehouse or in Washington as well as interacting with
corporate leaders, facilitating technology transfer agreements, sup-
porting research incubator projects, securing licensing agreements,
patents and intellectual property rights, overseeing auxiliary services
(hospitals, residence halls, athletics), and maximizing endowment re-
turns are important and time-consuming activities.
There may be agreement on the components of the role, but there
is no model of the presidency that identifies priorities between them.
Presidential activities are to a great extent contingent on the char-
acteristics of their institutions, the inexorable ebb and flow of the
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academic calendar, the emerging exigencies of the environment, and
their own personal interests. Some presidents spend a majority of
their time in fund-raising, public representation, and related resource
acquisition activities. The typical president spends little time on aca-
demic matters.
The pace, intensity, and comprehensiveness of the presidency are
in many ways comparable to those of managers and executives in
other settings.' But there is a fundamental difference. On a college
campus the exercise of authority in governance is not solely an ad-
ministrative prerogative but, rather, a shared responsibility and joint
effort that properly involves all important campus constituencies,
with particular emphasis given to the participation of the faculty. The
influential "Joint Statement on Government of Colleges and Univer-
sities," for example, gives to the faculty the "primary responsibility"
for "curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research,
faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the
educational process." In such matters, the president is expected to
"concur with the faculty judgment except in rare instances and for
compelling reasons which should be stated in detail." If, as it is gen-
erally agreed, the central questions that define the essential nature
of a college or university are "Who should teach?" "What should be
taught?" and "Who shall be taught?" the normative precepts of the
joint statement reserve these matters for the direct control of the fac-
ulty and not for either the president or the trustees.
The joint statement codifiedwhat had been true for many years at
academically strong campuses and what was evolving as good prac-
tice at many others. In doing so, it highlighted the basic managerial
dilemma of the president; essential questions of institutional "pro-
duction" or service, which would be considered matters of manage-
rial prerogative in other settings, were in colleges and universities to
be decided by the faculty, who were "employees." In a business firm,
the president or CEO is solely accountable to a board of directors. In
higher education, the president functions between two layers of orga-
nizational operations-the trustees and the faculty-and is account-
able to both. Conflict between constituent groups is common in many
organizations, but its importance and consequences for the college
president may be unique. In a business firm, presidential tenure is
the sole prerogative of the board of directors. Within many colleges
or universities, however, faculty (and often other groups as well) as-
sert the right to participate in presidential selection and evaluation.
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And, as many presidents have discovered, a faculty vote of no confi-
dence often has the same power to end a presidential career as does a
formal vote by the trustees to whom a president legally reports.'
The Impossible Job
There is no educational, social, or political consensus on exactly what
higher education should be doing, what constituencies it should serve,
and how it should serve them. At different times and on different cam-
puses, emphasis has been given to transmitting values, to discovering
knowledge, or to improving society.Some of the manifest purposes of
higher education - the education and development of individual stu-
dents, transmitting the culture and advancing society in general, pro-
viding for educational justice and social mobility, supporting intel-
lectual and artistic creativity, and evaluating society so that it can
become self-renewingv'<-enjoy general support as principles but be-
come contentious as people attempt to describe how such vague ideals
should best be implemented.
In addition to these obvious aims, colleges and universities have
latent purposes as well. Among other things, they serve a custodial
function by removing from parents the burden of controlling the be-
havior of young adults; they serve as a means of certifying to em-
ployers that graduates possess diligence and at least a modicum of
intelligence; they socialize students and help them develop networks
that will prove useful later in life; and they perpetuate the existing so-
cial order. These latter functions often conflict with the avowed pur-
poses of colleges and universities, and although less often discussed,
they are nonetheless important.
Goals of access, quality, and diversity, which are in conflict and
which call for quite different institutional structures and responses,
appear and then wane on the public policy agenda in cycles;the essen-
tial educational missions of teaching, research, and service compete
for resources; and there is no rational way to assess the legitimacy of
the competing and incompatible demands of many internal and ex-
ternal groups. Internally, faculty and administrators may disagree on
appropriate levels of workload or salary, students and faculty may
be in conflict about degree requirements or the academic calendar,
alumni and trustees may debate the virtues of tradition and change,
and students may disagree with administrative perspectives on offer-
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ing "living wages" to hourly university workers, making progress on
campus diversity, or purchasing athletic apparel from "sweatshops."
Externally, institutions may find themselves arguing with local gov-
ernments over the costs and availability of civic services and about
taxes, with environmental groups about research on genetically modi-
fied foods, with neighborhood associations over off campus housing,
with local businesses overselling competing services, and with local
institutions overaccepting transfer courses.
Virtually all of these demands have some merit, and few can be dis-
missed out of hand. Yet there is no accepted criterion presidents can
employ to judge the benefits of one course of action over another, and
little assurance that they could implement their preferences even if
they could specify them. Presidential authority is limited, complete
understanding of the scope and complexity of the enterprise exceeds
human cognitive capability, and unforeseen changes in demographic,
political, and economic conditions often overwhelm campus plans.
Presidents fortunate enough to preside during good times may reap
the benefits ofa munificent environment over which they have had no
control, and even the incompetent may appear heroic; presidents dur-
ing times of depression or social ferment may reap a whirlwind they
did not sow.
The following sections consider five of the factors that limit presi-
dential leadership: the constraints on presidential discretion; the
unique characteristics of academic organizations; the problems of as-
sessing effectiveness; privatization, market pressures, and competi-
tion; and the limitations of the presidential role.
Constraints on Presidential Discretion
Many factors increasingly limit presidential leadership.t- Some of
these result from interactions with other organizations, others arise
within the institutions themselves. Environmental constraints in-
clude, among others, more federal and state controls; involvement
by the courts in academic decision making; layers of governance and
oversight, particularly in institutions that are part of statewide sys-
tems; few opportunities for growth and consequently for changes ac-
companying growth; questions about the mission and purpose of
higher education; concerns about costs; issues of accountability and
quality; and a growing competitive and winner-take-a11 mentality
throughout society. Within institutions, constraints to leadership
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arise due to involvement by faculties in academic and personnel de-
cisions; faculty collective bargaining; goal ambiguity; fractionation of
the campus into interest groups, leading to a lack of consensus and
community; greater involvement by trustees into campus operations;
and increased bureaucracy and specialization among campus admin-
istrators.
Statewide coordinating or governing boards in almost all states
exercise increasing influence over matters reserved in the past for the
campus, including such critical issues as faculty personnel policies,
the creation of new academic degree programs, and the review of aca-
demic programs. They monitor institutions for program duplication,
cost containment and tuition pricing, admissions policies, and trans-
fer policies.
In addition, federal and state regulation and the courts limit presi-
dential discretion. For instance, many state governments set the tu-
ition levels of their public institutions, limiting ways in which insti-
tutions can generate revenue. Some states are exchanging one set
of constraints for another by giving institutions freedom from cer-
tain state regulations in return for more and different performance
measures. They are then tying public support to institutions' abili-
ties to deliver on these accountability measures. Public officials, not
academics, are deciding the essential performance indices, thus effec-
tively setting institutional priorities. Other state executive or legis-
lative agencies have become involved in facility review, administra-
tive operations, technology purchasing, budgeting, and planning. The
courts are involved in decisions such as allocating student activity
fees and determining admission practice, particularly in light of af-
firmative action. The federal government threatens to get involved
with institution policies regarding teacher preparation, earlyadmis-
sion decisions, and college costs, to name a few hot federal topics. Al-
though these intrusions focusmostly on public institutions, they may
also, directly or indirectly, affect private institutions. As the locus of
influence moves from the campus to the state, public sector presidents
may find themselves becoming like middle managers in public agen-
cies rather then campus leaders.
Accreditation - both regional, which reviews institutions, and spe-
cialized, which reviews particular academic programs and schools-
influences institutional behavior, policies, and priorities. It places re-
quirements on colleges and universities in the name of quality but,
as acknowledged by some observers, may also be motivated by status,
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privilege, or turf. Although accreditation is voluntary, most institu-
tions cannot choose to go without it because federal funding, pres-
tige, and the ability of campus graduates to work in some fields are
often linked to positive reviews. It is not unheard offor a single col-
lege or university to be undertaking reviews for multiple accredit-
ing organizations concurrently or consecutively. Institutions must re-
spond to the often narrow and frequently competing demands of each
to remain in good standing. For instance, accreditation can ask insti-
tutions to hire more full-time faculty in a particular area, alter cur-
ricula, or request more resources to support a particular discipline
or service. One former university president called the plethora of ac-
creditation "a straightjacket of many colors." 12 Even the head of the
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEAl, the oversight
organization for higher education accreditation, recognizes that col-
lege and university leaders "want accreditation to cost less, take less
time, and be more useful." 13
In addition to these constraints, presidential influence is severly
limited by both the paucity ofresources available and the short-term
difficulties in internally reallocating those resources that exist. Some
intangible campus resources, such as institutional prestige and at-
tractiveness to students and potential donors, are tied into a network
of external relationships that are virtually impossible to change in the
short run and difficult to change even over long periods of time. In-
ternally, on most campuses the personnel complement is largely fixed
through tenure and contractual provisions, program change is con-
strained by faculty interests and structures as well as by facility limi-
tations, and yearly planning begins with the largest share of the bud-
get precommitted.
Unique Organizational Factors
The administration of colleges and universities presents "a unique
dualism in organizational structure," 14 with two structures existing
in parallel. One is the conventional bureaucratic hierarchy responsive
to the will of the trustees; the other is the structure through which
faculty make decisions regarding those aspects of the institution over
which they have professionaljurisdiction. Trustees, who hold all legal
authority, are primarily business executives who are more likely than
the faculty to see the organization as comparable to a business firm
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in its structure and authority pattern and to support top-down man-
agement. The president, viewed as their CEO, is expected to carry
out their wishes and to be accountable for faculty performance. The
faculty, on the other hand, expect to exercise primary authority over
educational processes, and trustee or presidential intrusion into aca-
demic affairs is likely to be viewed as illegitimate.
The problems caused by dual control are exacerbated by the con-
flicting nature of administrative and professional authority. In most
organizations, major goals and activities are subject to the bureau-
cratic authority of administrators, which arises from their position
within the hierarchy and their legal right to give directives. The pro-
fessional authority of faculty members, on the other hand, comes from
their expertise and training." Administrative and professional au-
thority are not only different but also mutually inconsistent, driven
by incompatible systems of authority. The president is imbedded in
both authority systems, and therefore is continually subject to in-
compatible demands and behavioral expectations." As the leader of a
bureaucracy, the president is expected to establish goals, decide how
they are to be achieved, scientifically organize the work of subordi-
nates, plan, and monitor organizational functioning. As the head of
a professional and collegial body, the president is expected to be the
first among equals and to move the group toward consensus by listen-
ing, proposing, mediating, persuading, and influencing through infor-
mation sharing and appeals to reason. The use of legal authority or
status differentials, which is an important means of gaining influence
in one system, is illegitimate and unacceptable in the other.
This dual system of authority is even further confused in larger and
more complex institutions as schools or departments, and sometimes
even certain within-department or cross-department research insti-
tutes and centers become the locus of decision making. These units
may have little or no managerial culture 17 or, for the most part, any
interest in university management. Thus, presidential influence over
their activities decreases still further. The institution may become an
academic holding company for a federation of quasi-autonomous sub-
units. Unable to influence the larger institution, faculty may retreat
into the small subunit for which they feel affinity and fromwhich they
can defend their influence and status, and presidential influence over
their activities decreases still further.
550 Robert Birnbaumand Peter D.Eckel
Problems of Assessing Effectiueness
The particular organizational complexities of colleges and universi-
ties, exacerbated by the conflicting demands of their environments
and the difficulty of understanding exactly how they function, has led
to their identification as "organized anarchies." 18 An organized anar-
chy exhibits three characteristics: problematic goals, an unclear tech-
nology, and fluid participation in decision-making processes.
The concept of organized anarchy suggests that colleges and uni-
versities often make choices through a process of "garbage-can de-
cision making." 19 Problems, solutions, and participants form steady
streams, flowing through the organization as if they were poured into
a large can. When one participant tries to make a decision, others
in the can may become attached to it because they are contempora-
neous, even though they may not appear to be logically connected.
For example, a presidential decision to build a faculty parking lot on
some unused campus land would appear to be easily made if there
were enough data on parking needs and available resources to per-
form a cost/benefit analysis. But such apparently simple decisions be-
come incredibly complex as elements seen by the decision maker as
extraneous (that is, "garbage") become attached to it. The biology de-
partment may argue that the lot will destroy adjacent trees and use
the incident to press its continuing proposal for an institutional en-
vironmental master plan; a candidate for student government office
may use the lot as a symbol of administration indifference to student
needs and ask for student membership on the board of trustees; and
a faculty member may link the cost to recent cuts in library budgets
and use the incident as a forum for discussing educational priorities.
Since "garbage" is in the eye of the beholder, it is possible for almost
any two issues to be seen by someone on campus as connected and for
any problem to become coupled to any decision. Making a decision on
the parking lot may be impossible unless some way can be found of
severing its connection to environmental plans, student trustees, and
educational priorities.
Institutional outcomes may be a result of only modestly interde-
pendent activities and are often neither planned nor predictable. For
example, a campus may receive a federal research grant because a
president gave additional resources to a department, because a grant
proposal by chance was assigned to one reviewer rather than another,
or because the granting agency was obliged to seek a geographic dis-
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tribution in its awards. People in different parts of the organization
may have access to information making any of these or other expla-
nations plausible. Such ambiguity inhibits the making of valid in-
ferences about cause and effect, and presidential learning becomes
exceptionally difficult. Presidents may spend more time in sense mak-
ing20 and in engaging in activities that verify or enhance their status,
than in decision making. The decoupling of choices and outcomes
makes symbolic behavior particularly important.
The ambiguities of institutional life are intensified by the absence
in colleges and universities of accepted and valid indicators of effec-
tiveness. There are different definitions of effectiveness, all of which
are difficult to measure; different audiences use different criteria to
make the assessment; and achievement of effectiveness in one area
of institutional functioning may inhibit or prevent it in another."
Without measures of organizational effectiveness, it becomes difficult
for presidents-or others-to objectivelyassess presidential effective-
ness. As a consequence, institutional outcomes in general, and percep-
tions of presidential success or failure in particular, may be "largely
a matter of luck .... The president is always in a war, and whether
he wins or loses bears only a marginal relation to his foresight, his
wisdom, his charm, his blood pressure."22 In the final analysis, "the
effects that presidents can have on their campuses are confounded
by the actions of other institutional leaders, changes in the environ-
ment, and internal organizational processes such as culture and his-
tory that are difficult to change. Presidents are major participants in
institutional events that have important organizational consequences
... but in many ways they followcommon scripts and play roles that
are independent of their own personal characteristics." 23
Privatization, Market Pressures, and Competition
Trends in the privatization of higher education and the pull of the
competitive marketplace add new challenges and exacerbate ongoing
dilemmas for university presidents. Privatization, resulting from a
shift in relying heavily on public or governmental funds to a greater
dependence on private sources, is characterized in academe by the
shift of academic research to marketable knowledge, growth of entre-
preneurial goals for institutions, the outsourcing of services, and an
increase in the students' burden to pay for more of their education
through loans than grants. The result is a close relationship with a
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marketplace that favors and encourages, as well as rewards, activities
and research in certain market-sensitive fields, such as engineering,
applied natural science, and agricultural science over other programs,
such as humanities disciplines. It also promotes activities that have a
market value resulting in more students-particularly those that can
afford to pay the high tuition prices-new contracts and partnership
agreements and enhanced research programs."
Administrators may have little option except to respond to the
marketplace, for if their institution does not react effectivelyothers-
both traditional universities as well as nontraditional providers-are
poised to do so.As a result ofprivatization and market pressures, the
ability to compete-for students, resources, faculty, and prestige-in
turn, becomes a strong priority. Institutions unable to be competitive
may face increasingly difficult circumstances as public support does
not keep pace with institutional need, students become more edu-
cated consumers, and technology and new entrants into higher edu-
cation widen the field of competitors. Colleges and universities may
pursue certain revenue-generating strategies over other types of ac-
tivities. The downside of pursuing market goals without appropri-
ately balancing the public good is that institutions face the threat of
losing their privileged place in American society as they come to re-
semble other organizations. Birnbaum notes, "OUf narratives once
told of education for democracy, for social justice, for the whole per-
son, for the perpetuation of civilization. That is what people came to
believe colleges and universities did, and that is whywe enjoyed such
support and admiration. Our narratives now increasingly talk about
being engines of the economy.We are, of course, but I don't believe
that a utilitarian narrative alone excites the imagination ofthe public,
or commits faculty, staff or administrators to their institutions and
its success, or connects the university to our deepest human needs."25
Privatization and the rise of the market also have the potential to
change internal institutional dynamics. Power may shift even further
away from the administrative center to departments, centers, and
units able to generate revenue. Because of their newfound economic
clout, these units in turn may demand greater autonomy from central
oversight, decide to contribute less to university-wide activities and
priorities, and even relocate themselves physically in their own new
buildings or a separate campus. Look at the behavior of some busi-
ness schools for examples.
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Limitations of the Presidential Role
Much of the literature on the presidential role comes from presidents
themselves. There is a tendency by some to celebrate their own ac-
complishments, but there is often a strong undercurrent of despair or
anger along with resignation to the fact that, in the long run, their
success or failure may be due more to the vagaries ofluck and history
than to their own dedication and skill. Presidents are subject to role
overload and role ambiguity, as they respond both to their own per-
sonal interpretations of their roles and to the legitimate demands of
many groups.
One consequence of multiple and conflicting roles is that any ac-
tions by a president are likely to be criticized by someone. For former
University of Michigan James Duderstadt, the ongoing attacks con-
jured images of the ruthlessness of the Wild West: "The president is
expected to be the defender of the faith, both of the institution itself
and the academic values so important to the university. I sometimes
thought of this latter role as roughly akin to that of a tired, old sher-
iff in a frontier western town. Every day I would have to drag my
bruised, wounded carcass out of bed, strap on my guns, and go out
into the main street to facewhatever gunslingers had riden in to shoot
up the town that day. Sometimes these were politicians; other times
the media; still other times various special interest groups on campus;
even occasionally other university leaders such as deans or regents."26
The pace, the unrelenting pressure, and the marginal membership of
presidents in conflicting groups affect their health, both physical and
mental. Every decision will have its personal costs. And private time
for family or recreation will be scarce.
The popular view of the role may identify the president as a larger-
than-life, heroic leader, whose wise decisions and forceful adminis-
tration solve problems and advance the institution's fortunes. But in
fact, presidential decisions may have little effect on disparate orga-
nizational subsystems; changes in the environment may often over-
power any internal changes; and administrative structures and pro-
cesses of organization and control are relatively weak vis-a-vis the
autonomy of professional participants. A president can attend to only
a small number of matters, but there is no way of knowing before-
hand (or often even afterward, for that matter) whether these are
the most important matters. These problems led Michael Cohen and
James March to call the presidency an illusion: "Important aspects
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of the role seem to disappear on close examination. Compared to the
heroic expectations he and others might have, the president has mod-
est control over the events of college life. The contributions he makes
can easily be swamped by outside events or the diffuse quality of un i-
versity decision making."" These limits on influence and the ambi-
guities of purpose, power, experience, and success make it difficult for
presidents to learn what works.
If the institution has ambiguous and multiple purposes and lacks a
sense of shared direction, how can presidents justify their actions or
know if they have been successful? If influence is dispersed through-
out the institution and decentralized, how can presidents know how
much power they have or what they can or cannot do? If what hap-
pens on a campus depends as much on the actions of others and on
environmental pressures as it does on presidential behavior, what
can presidents accurately learn from their experiences? And if presi-
dents have confirmed their success earlier in their careers because
they have been promoted, how can they assess their present success
when promotion is no longer possible?
Behavioral and Cognitive Strategies
Survival requires the development of coping mechanisms that help
the organization and the people within it make sense ofthe ambigui-
ties of their daity lives. Colleges and universities have evolvedways of
responding to the difficulties caused by their complex environmental
relationships, inchoate influence patterns, and inability to rational-
ize their technology. For example, institutions meet the conflicting de-
mands of interest groups by decentralizing and permitting subunits
to operate in a quasi-autonomous fashion. Subunits can then meet
specific needs, but the cost is high: presidential authority is dimin-
ished, it becomes almost impossible to coordinate activities, and main-
taining a sense of coherence and common purpose is extremely diffi-
cult.
Institutions may attempt to cope with the difficulty of assessing
effectiveness by publicly focusing attention on inputs (such as per-
centage of faculty with doctorates) and activities (such as the number
of students studying aboard) rather than outputs (how much a stu-
dent has learned). Even with calls for public accountability, increased
rigor of accreditation reviews, and the assessment movement, insti-
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tutions, for the most part, discourage inspection. Instead they rely on
institutional reputation and tradition OT, when pressed, use measures
that portray them most positively rather than offer objective evalua-
tion. Within this organizational ambiguity, with conflicting authority
structures, multiple social systems, and contested goals, presidents
are expected to provide leadership, direction, coherence, and progress
in an organization.
Many suggestions have been offered to make the presidential job
more doable. One common proposal is to strenghten the presidency
through selecting better presidents. It assumes (although without
supporting data) that today's presidents do not have the same charac-
teristics of courage and decisiveness as presidents of the past. For in-
stance, the title of a report from the Association of Governing Boards
(AGB) of Colleges and Universities' Commission on the Academic
Presidency boldly calls for "stronger leadership for tougher times.""
The inference is that institutions need strong presidential leaders.
This wish, however, can be a slippery slope as expectations for lead-
ers reach new heights to which few can attain. Management scholar
Henry Mintzberg wrote: "We seem to be moving beyond leaders who
merely lead; today heroes save. Soon heroes will only save; then gods
will redeem. We keep upping the ante .... "29 The obvious solution is
for presidential search committees to seek stronger and more decisive
candidates. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the presidency
could be strengthened by increasing the legal authority of the posi-
tion as well as curtailing the influence of other stakeholders and clari-
fying and delimiting their roles in shared governance. If one of the
causes of presidential weakness is the anarchical nature of the orga-
nization, then a possible solution is to increase the use ofrational pro-
cesses-rather than political or symbolic processes-in institutional
decision making. But the many attempts to do so through imposing
management systems, budgeting and planning processes, restructur-
ing and re-engineering initiatives, and performance measures have by
and large not had the desired and expected effects." In many cases,
the processes set up to respond to the problems have onlyexacerbated
them.
It has also been suggested that presidential effectiveness might
be improved if trustee boards provided more support to their presi-
dents, giving them leadership positions on the board, encouraging
faculty support for them, resisting attempts to involve boards in ad-
ministration, and using presidents as their sole conduit into the ad-
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ministrative structure.'! The frantic pace of presidential life has also
been identified as a major constraint upon presidential effectiveness,
and it has been suggested that providing presidents with more per-
sonal assistance would free their time for contemplation and long-
term planning. This suggestion almost always overlooks the likeli-
hood that presidents do not become busy people but rather that busy
people become presidents. Presidents complain about lack of time for
contemplation, but there is no reason to believe that if they had more
free time they would use it for that purpose.
There is no dearth of advice about how to be a successful president.
Some authorities suggest that presidents remain distant, others that
they be intimately involved with constituents; that they focus on re-
source acquisition or that they focus on academic matters; that they
stress accountability or that they foster creativity; that they set goals
or that they help others achieve their own goals. The proposals are
inconsistent, and their behavioral implications are unclear. Never-
theless, the following section suggests some presidential administra-
tive strategies that might increase their effectiveness and improve
their institutions.s' It also examines some of the cognitive and sym-
bolic strategies that permit presidents and institutions to cope with
the discrepancies between authority and responsibility, expectations
and achievement. Finally, it considers the possibility that, hecause of
certain characteristics of colleges and universities, a weak presidency
may have an important organizational function.
Successful Administrative Strategies
Successful presidents are likely to he realists rather than idealists.
They accept a decentralized structure, conflicting authority systems,
and loose coupling as inherent organizational characteristics and try
to work within these constraints. They know that essential institu-
tional functions are likely to continue to operate, even in the ab-
sence ofpresidential direction, because of ongoing administrative sys-
tems and the largely autonomous activities of professional faculties.
In many ways, the organization works as a cyhernetic system in which
negative feedback serves to activate processes that maintain the in-
stitution's current level of functioning.P Presidents appreciate that
some oftheir energy will be occupied with the day-to-day activities of
monitoring these processes and with identifying and attending to in-
stitutional weaknesses and problems.
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However, presidents also recognize that they can have an impact
on the institution if they focus on a few limited objectivesor programs
and devote extraordinary energy to them. Presidents can be effective
even in areas such as curriculum in which administrative influence
is traditionally weak if they are willing to accept the inevitable cost
of other opportunities forgone. Presidents understand that all change
is not their personal responsibility as many new efforts and modifi-
cations will occur hecause of the leadership and initiative of faculty
and staff throughout the institution, often through ongoing processes.
Presidents who try to do too many things, either on their own initia-
tive or in response to perceived environmental demands, mostly end
up accomplishing none of them.
Effective presidents understand the culture oftheir institution and
the symbolic aspects of their positions. Recognizing that their effec-
tiveness as leaders depends upon the willingness of highly trained
professionals to be followers, they avoid actions that would violate
cultural and academic norms and thereby diminish their own status.
Effective presidents spend a great deal of time in understanding their
institutional culture. They go out of their way to walk around their
campuses to see and be seen, to confer with other formal and informal
campus leaders for opinions and advice, to learn institutional histo-
ries, and to understand the expectations others have of presidential
behavior. They also recognize that as a symbolic leader they must con-
sistently articulate the core values of the institution and relate them
to all aspects of institutional life in order to sustain and reinvigo-
rate the myths that create a common reality. Management skills may
be a necessary, but usually not a sufficient, concomitant of presiden-
tial success. For example, Ellen Chaffee has suggested that presidents
who focus on resource acquisition strategies alone to resolve fiscal
crises are not as successful as those who combine them with interpre-
tative strategies that change campus perceptions and attitudes."
Since centralized control cannot be achieved in complex, nonlinear,
social systems, effective presidents realize that prevention of error is
not possible. They therefore emphasize the design of systems to de-
tect error and to make institutional processes self-correcting. They
support the collection, analysis, and public dissemination of data on
aspects of institutional functioning, data that permit interest groups
to monitor the institution. Organizational stability is increased as in-
stitutional components pay attention to different aspects of the envi-
ronment and serve as controls and checks on each other's activities.
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The effectiveness ofa free flowof information is increased when presi-
dents support and publicly articulate the value of open communica-
tion and a will to tolerate and encourage, rather than to punish, dis-
agreement.
Effective presidents recognize that the inherent specialization and
fractionation essential to the maintenance of quality and responsive-
ness must be coordinated unobtrusively in order to avoid alienation.
They do this in part by establishing formal opportunities for inter-
action, and they emphasize forums such as senates, cabinets, retreats,
and task forces that bring together persons representing different
constituencies and different institutional levels. Senate presidents
who sit on administrative councils, deans who attend senate meet-
ings, and students, faculty, and administrators who serve on joint
committees interact in ways that make their perceptions and inter-
ests more consistent.
Presidential effectiveness is based as much upon influence as upon
authority, and influence in an academic institution depends upon mu-
tual and reciprocal processes of social exchange. Effective presidents
influence others by allowing themselves to be influenced. This re-
quires that presidents listen carefully, which might be difficult for
presidents who believe that the proper role of leaders is to tell others
what to do. Academic management is not, as Mintzberg suggests,
"management by barking around." 35
Cognitive and Symbolic Strategies
Individuals typically become presidents after successful performance
in a series of related positions of increasing responsibility. One reason
for considering the presidency an impossible job is the extensive criti-
cism by reputable sources directed at the presumably failing efforts
of people so previously accomplished. Presidents rely upon uncon-
scious cognitive strategies to reconcile this discrepancy between past
achievement and present criticism. They see themselves as successful
even as others see them as failing.
Presidents talk easily about the deficiencies oftheir confreres, but
when asked about their own performance, self-assessments are al-
most uniformly positive. In one study, presidents rated the quality of
their own "institutional leadership" as seventy-seven on a hundred-
point scale, while they rated that of the "average president" as sixty-
six and their predecessor as only fifty-two.ae They also indicated that
The Dilemmaof Presidential Leadership 559
the quality of their own campus had improved oneach of seven dimen-
sions since they became president, a finding contradicted by a host of
recent reports critical ofAmerican higher education. Presidents build
schemas of effectiveness based upon previous career success; when
they encounter ambiguous situations, they are likely to anticipate,
and therefore to observe, successful outcomes and to attribute these
to their own efforts. When presidents were asked to identify a recent
event that had positive outcomes on their campus, for example, 74
percent indicated that they had initiated it. But when asked to iden-
tify an event with a negative outcome, only 14 percent accepted re-
sponsibility. There seems to be evidence of a success bias that leads
these successful people to believe that they have been responsible
for successful outcomes, and that permits them to disassociate them-
selves from failure. In a recent study of the performance of thirty-two
college presidents, all but one considered themselves successful, even
though a quarter of them had lost sufficient constituent support to be
identified by the researcher as having been a failure at the job."
Academic presidents occupya prestigious position in American life.
They are major figures in their communities, sought after as speakers
for local functions, and interviewed by the media. They are at the core
of impressive academic ceremonies, they have the highest salaries and
most significant perquisites a campus has to offer (certain athletic
coaches excluded), and they are surrounded by respectful aides and
by associates with vested interests in maintaining a successful presi-
dency.
The Latent Organizational Functions
of Impossibility
It may be so vital for symbolic reasons for organizational members
to believe that their leaders are important that both leaders and fol-
lowers may cope with the reality of weak presidential influence by
constructing an illusion of their power. We have developed highly ro-
manticized, heroic views of leadership-what leaders do, what they
are able to accomplish, and the general effects they have upon our
lives. It amounts to what might be considered a faith in the potential
if not in the actual efficacyof those individuals."
In many situations, presidential leadership may not be real but,
rather, a social attribution, a result of the tendency of campus con-
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stituents to assign to a president the responsibility for unusual in-
stitutional outcomes because the president fills a role identified as a
leader, because presidents are visible and prominent, because presi-
dents spend a great deal of time doing leaderlike things (such as en-
gaging in ceremonial and symbolicactivities), and because we all have
the need to believe in the effectiveness of individual control. Leaders
are people believed by followers to have caused events. "Successful
leaders," says Jeffrey Pfeffer, "are those who can separate themselves
from organizational failures and associate themselves with organiza-
tional successes." 39
In organizations with clear goals, understood technologies, and
hierarchical power structures, illusionary leadership may be dysfunc-
tional. In such institutions, increasing the authority of competent
leaders would reduce the extent to which their job might be thought
of as impossible and would thereby increase organizational effective-
ness. But when these organizational characteristics are not present,
it is highly questionable whether increasing presidential power would
yield positive outcomes. It may even be that the very factors respon-
sible for the impossibility of the presidential role are also important
components of organizational effectiveness and that action taken to
strengthen the one would weaken the other. Higher education may be
effective not despite its arational characteristics but because of them.
While presidents may rail against the frustrations of their job, they
assumed their positions aware of the constraints they would face.
Some may have had egocentric motives, but for most a natural inter-
est in power, money, and prestige is strongly tempered by a dedication
to the enduring values of education and a commitment to serve the
interests of their institutions. If the presidency had greater authority
than it does, it might attract to it a different kind of person, one per-
haps less committed to the concept of leader as institutional servant
and more to the concept ofleader as institutional master. Itmight be
that if presidents had greater authority they might enjoy it more, but
in Harold Stoke's thoughtful aphorism, "those who enjoy it are not
very successful, and those who are successful are not very happy....
Those who enjoy exercising power shouldn't have it, and those who
should exercise it are not likely to enjoy it."·o
The collegial traditions of higher education suggest that presiden-
tial vacancies are filled by faculty who are selected by their colleagues,
serve them in leadership roles for limited terms, and then return to
their first love-teaching and research. While this may be more a
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fond fantasy than an established fact, it reflects the normative sense
among many academics that, while college teaching may be a pro-
fession, high administrative office is only one of several temporary
roles within it. The critical difference is between seeing the presi-
dency as a profession and seeing it as a role. Incumbents who view the
presidency as a profession are likely to see the maintenance of their
position as a major objective. Such presidents "simplify their task by
making only one calculation-calculating what is contributory to the
welfare of the president, given the incentives to do so in the presence
of job insecurity on the one hand and the impossibility of a precise
definition of the institution's general welfare on the other."" In con-
trast, incumbents who see the presidency as a role can give primary
attention to the needs of the institution rather than of themselves.
This makes it possible for them to accept that, sometimes, the great-
est service a president can perform is to leave office, because "the sur-
vival of the president is not the goal. The leader is temporary and, if
necessary, expendable in service to the potential value of the institu-
tion."" Presidents who viewtheir obligations as part ofa role are able
to enjoy the roller coaster of the presidency during its initial phases
and then leave without regret. They are able to see themselves as an
important but replaceable component in a large, cybernetic organiza-
tion, and they are able to "cope by perceiving exit as a symbolic, po-
litical act of a pluralistic democratic organization, not as a threat to
managerial competence."43
Some presidents never come to terms with the impossible nature
of their jobs. Frustrated in their attempts to have the influence they
desire, they may eventually find solace in cognitive distortions that
lead them to see what they wish to see. Others may follow the route
of the zealot, redoubling their efforts as they lose sight of their goals.
One consequence of these behaviors is to create self-fulfillingprophe-
sies: aggressive administrative action leads to resistance, which in
turn becomes the justification for still more assertive presidential be-
havior. Other presidents make peace with their positions by bring-
ing to it an understanding of the peculiar nature of their organiza-
tions and of their roles within them. Their goal is a peaceful balance
of institutional interests within which they can make marginal im-
provements in a limited number of areas. They reconcile themselves
to the possibility of future failure by acknowledging the role played by
uncontrollable external sources, recognizing that some of what hap-
pens to them-both good and bad-may be a product of luck. Presi-
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dential roles may be as much a product of social attributions as a set
of desirable behaviors. By creating a role that we declare will pro-
vide leadership to an organization, we construct the attribution that
organizational effects are due to the leader's behavior. This allows us
to simplify and make sense of complex organizational processes that
would otherwise be impossible to comprehend." It is perhaps as sen-
sible to say that successful organizational events cause effective presi-
dents as it is to say that effective presidents cause successful events.
One of the reasons that collegesand universities have been so suc-
cessful is that, as their environments have become more complex,
they have created decentralized, flexible, and only moderately inter-
dependent structures, which have been effective in responding to en-
vironmental change. This may make coordination by the president
exceptionally difficult, but the same forces that limit presidential au-
thority may also make these organizations exceptionally adaptable
and stable. The paradox ofan institution that gives precedence to pro-
fessional, rather than administrative, authority is that management
weakness may be a significant source of organizational strength.
Calls for strengthening the presidency abound, but they are com-
monly grounded in a view of presidential power based more on hope
than on experience. The report of a comprehensive five-year study
of academic leadership reached a conclusion about the importance of
presidents that, if less heroic than the views of many, may be more
realistic:
Presidents may be important in some situations, but the performance
of colleges may usually be less dependent upon presidential leader-
ship than most of us care to believe. Most college presidents do the
right things, and do things right most of the time. It is possible that
college leaders can become marginally more effective. But those who
seek major changes in the ways presidents behave, or believe that such
changes will make major differences on our campuses, are likely to be
disappointed .... Good presidents come to their positions with useful
competencies, integrity, faith in their colleagues, and a firm belief that
by listening carefully and working together they can all do well. In a
turbulent and uncertain world, what happens after that is as much in
the laps of the gods as in the hands of the president."
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